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AFRICANIZATION AND THE REFORM 
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW  
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe* 
Abstract 
Recent trends in reforms by African states in the field of 
International Investment Law (“IIL”) have been dubbed as the 
Africanization of IIL. These important debates regarding reform of IIL 
in Africa foreground innovative aspects of International Investment 
Agreements (“IIA”) in contrast to the traditional IIL regime. The 
debates also remind us of the relative lack of African voices in the global 
IIL reform agenda. There is, however, little research that critically 
analyzes the Africanization of IIL thesis. This article undertakes this 
analysis. Drawing on TWAIL, this article characterizes Africanization 
of IIL into “moderate” and “radical” reforms. The article analyzes the 
normative features of Africanization of IIL. In this regard, it enriches 
existing substantive analysis, and advances the debates by 
interrogating the contours and blind spots of Africanization in IIL. It 
argues that the Africanization thesis, being so far limited to the IIAs 
between African states, is a “moderate” response from below to the 
systemic inequities of the IIL regime. Moderate Africanization of IIL — 
a modest and incremental approach to the reform of IIL — engenders 
challenges for African states as they remain nestled in the neoliberal 
paradigm. To address this deficit and expand the geographies of African 
centered IIAs to reform and remake IIL, this article makes the case for 
a cascading of the Africanization thesis in more radical normative form 
based on a constellation of strategic moderate changes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article critically analyzes the on-going reforms in International 
Investment Law (“IIL”) and policy in Africa and questions the extent 
to which the reforms address and remake the systemic issues in the field 
of IIL. IIL is enmeshed in the long history of an imperial economy. The 
field is notorious for the complicity of investors in the host states and 
the controversies that they generate.1 At the heart of any critique of 
IIL is a rejection of the post-colonial continuities of the technologies of 
governance and the asymmetry that characterizes foreign investor 
relations in the host states.2 An expanded understanding of the empire 
as a practice and structure of unequal international integration reveals 
the enduring continuities between Global North and Global South.3  
Skepticism and backlash of IIL have grown simultaneously with 
existential debate about its own legitimacy.4 First, the empirical 
 
1. See generally Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) 
Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 
346 (2007); DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC 
GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW, 1–2 (David Cowan ed., 2013). M. SORNARAJAH, 
RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2015). 
2. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, Postcolonial Legality: A Postscript from India, 
45 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE/LAW & POLITICS IN AFR., 
ASIA & LATIN AMERICA 178, 193 (2012); David Schneiderman, The 
Coloniality of Investment Law, SSRN (May 21, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392034 [https://perma.cc/3VWG-4CMQ] 
(exploring the continuities of colonialism and inquiring into the question 
whether the legal rules in the post-colony are in service of the economic 
interest of the metropolitan). 
3. See generally ADOM GETACHEW, WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION 31–32 (2019). 
4. See generally David Schneiderman, International Investments Law’s 
Unending Legitimation Project, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 229 (2017); Julian 
Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2019) (Demonstrating how IIL and ISDS displace 
and distort national private law across the fields of property law, 
contracts, corporations, and intellectual property, and laying the 
foundation for a refocused project of reform). 
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evidence on the interconnectedness of foreign investment to economic 
growth in host states is contested.5 Critics have argued that foreign 
investment law entrenches the imperial and capitalist interests of 
multinational corporations at the detriment of host states.6 Contrary 
to the promise of spurring economic development in developing 
countries, IIL entrenches the interests of investors.7 The dilemma 
regarding the value of foreign investment to their economic 
development thus persists.8 In some cases, this has generated backlash 
through dissenting legislation.9 Second, dispute regimes in IIL have 
been effectively used in pursuit of the interests of investors.10 The 
 
5. For example, Ghana has been attracting most of its investments from 
countries with which it does not have investment treaties. If investment 
treaties were that crucial or singular in attracting investments, Ghana 
and similarly placed African countries would probably not attract 
investments from countries with which they have not entered into 
investment treaties. See Dominic Npoanlari Dagbanja, Can African 
Countries Attract Investments Without Bilateral Investment Treaties? 
The Ghanaian Case, 40 AUSTRALASIAN REV. AFRICAN STUD. 71 (2019); 
Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical 
Discussion, 2 TRADE L. & DEV. 19 (2010).  
6. See generally JOHN LINARELLI ET AL., THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CONFRONTATIONS WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 
5 (2018); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1, at 28; Jean Ho, The Creation of 
Elusive Investor Responsibility, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 10 (2019) (arguing 
that elusive investor responsibility was created by omission, with injurious 
consequences that highlight the need to alter, rather than accept, the 
status quo). 
7. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND 
PUBLIC LAW 3, 8 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2007); Michael Waibel et al., The 
Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
(Kluwer L. Int’l Working Paper, 2010).  
8. Samuel K. B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A 
Reappraisal, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 588, 616 (1988). 
9. For example, Tanzania has proposed a series of investment reforms across 
various fields given the perception of unfairness against it. See Tanzania 
Overhauls Mining Laws, Fines Investor US$190 Billion: Is Your 
Investment Protected?, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Aug. 2017), 
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/08/tanzania-overhauls-
mining-laws-fines-investor-us190-billion-is-your-investment-protected 
[https://perma.cc/54K8-7FXV]. See also Dilini Pathirana, Sovereign 
Rights to Natural Resources as a Basis for Denouncing International 
Adjudication of Investment Disputes: A Reflection on the Tanzanian 





10. Antony Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change: Should 
International Law Lead or Follow?, 5 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 1316, 
1360 (2011). 
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Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) regime is fraught with a 
myriad of challenges appropriately encapsulated in the regime’s bias 
critique.11 The ISDS system’s challenges arise from its transparency 
crisis, questions about the independence of arbitrators, contradictions 
between arbitral awards, underrepresentation of African arbitrators, 
and concerns relating to costs and time of arbitral procedures.12 Third, 
critical voices from the Global South — Africa in particular — have 
been marginalized in the ongoing ISDS reform process.13  
For over a decade now, regional, sub-regional and national legal 
reforms across Africa have been at the forefront of IIL.14 These reforms 
center at the interests of African states and seek to address their 
subordinate position in the global economic hierarchy.15 The reforms 
incorporate rules for sustainable development, protection of the 
environment, and the rights of the marginalized.16 The 2007 Investment 
Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(“COMESA”) Common Investment Area (“CCIA”) set African states 
on the oath of regional investment reforms.17 Most recently, the Pan-
 
11. See id.; see also James Thuo Gathii, Third World Approaches to 
International Economic Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
THIRD WORLD, RESHAPING JUSTICE 255, 261 (Richard Falk, 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jacqueline Stevens eds., 2008). 
12. Lorenzo Cotula & Terrence Neal, UNCITRAL Working Group III: Can 
Reforming Procedures Rebalance Investor Rights and Obligations?, 




13. Won Kidane, Africa’s International Investment Law Regimes, OXFORD 
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0198.xml [https://perma.cc/7A35-
E899]; James Thuo Gathii & Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Symposium 
Introduction: Centering Voices from the Global South on Investor-State 




(introducing six essays that debate and center perspectives from the 
Global South on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform and 
categorizing them into defenders of the ISDS regime and contributions 
that are critical of the system and seek reform). 
14. See Schneiderman, supra note 2, at 1.  
15. Id. 
16. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 5. See generally Dominic N. Dagbanja, 
Africa, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
226, 336–362 (2019). 
17. See generally Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common 
Investment Area, May 23, 2007, 
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African Investment Code (“PAIC”) is the anchor through which 
African states codified their interests in IIAs.18 However, the PAIC is a 
model agreement with no binging effect.19 Makane Moïse Mbengue and 
Stephan Schill dub the innovative developments in the PAIC and other 
IIAs as the Africanization of IIL.20 The developments, Mbengue argues, 
make Africa “…an interesting laboratory for the rethinking and 
reshaping of international investment law.”21  
In this article, I draw on Third World Approaches to International 
Law (“TWAIL”) to critically analyze the extant conceptualization of 
Africanization and its association with IIL. The article probes the 
conceptualization of “Africanization” of IIL by situating it in the 
broader critiques and analysis of IIL regime in the Global South.22 In 
particular, I immerse the Africanization thesis in the critique, reform, 
and remaking agenda of TWAIL.23 This analysis will deepen our 
understanding of the contours and blind spots of the Africanization 





18. See Econ. Comm’n for Afr. Comm. of Experts, Draft Pan-African 
Investment Code, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/COE/35/18 (Mar. 26, 2016). 
19. Id. 
20. Makane Moïse Mbengue, Special Issue: Africa and the Reform of the 
International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 371, 376 
(2017). 
21. Id. 
22. See generally Antonius R Hippolyte, Aspiring for a Constructive TWAIL 
Approach Towards the Foreign Investment Regime, in FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT LAW and DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 180 
(Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hofmann eds., 2015). 
23. Gathii, supra note 11, at 255; Upendra Baxi, Some Newly Emergent 
Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and Borders in International Law, 
23 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 15, 24 (2016). 
24. To be sure, the aim of this article is neither to revisit questions of the 
evolution or contribution of Africa to the development of international 
investment law; questions around the substantive provisions of 
international investment agreements and the debates around regulatory 
autonomy; queries and contestations in global and regional reforms of 
international investment law; nor the value of regionalization vis-à-vis the 
global IIL regime. See generally Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Reverse 
Contributors? African State Parties, ICSID and the Development of 
International Investment Law, 34 ICSID REV. (2019).  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Africanization and the Reform of International Investment Law 
12 
 
II. Moderate vs Radical Africanization of IIL 
The Africanization of IIL is about the progressive reform and 
remaking of the IIL regime.25 At its core, Africanization of IIL 
encapsulates substantive and procedural reforms of the IIL regime.26 It 
is about giving voice and ownership to the legislative and treaty reforms 
that center the interests of African states.27 African states’ effort at 
reforming and remaking IIL span across regional, sub-regional, and 
national spheres, as well as IIAs or bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”) between African states.28 This article makes explicit the value 
and inherent contradictions that animate the “Africanization” thesis in 
IIL.  
I characterize the Africanization of IIL into two: moderate and 
radical. Moderate Africanization of IIL consists of modest, incremental, 
or piecemeal reform of IIL. While useful, the approach does not alter 
the fundamental unequal architecture of IIL.29 In other words, while 
useful, moderate Africanization of IIL keeps African states intensely 
enveloped in the neoliberal paradigm that underpins the IIL regime. 
The reformulation of Africanization principles in response to critiques 
sustains the market’s fundamental visions of foreign investment law.30 
A half-hearted reform agenda that leaves the core of IIL intact does 
little to substantively restructure the subordinate position of African 
states. While progressive, a moderate response to the asymmetry of the 
IIL regime engenders more challenges for African states. A moderate 
form of Africanization reifies and entrenches the core tenets of the 
received system. However, moderate Africanization has been successful 
in its agenda for reform. For example, the innovative provisions that 
distinguish them are becoming a norm in intra-African BITs and IIAs.31 
But, the agenda of moderate Africanization has been limited in South-
South and North-South treaties.32 There is no evidence yet that the 







30. See generally Sornarajah Muthucumaraswamy, Mutations of Neo-
Liberalism in International Investment Law, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 203, 
205 (2011). 
31. See generally Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Rule-Takers 
or Rule-Makers? A New Look at African Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Practice (NCCR Trade Regul., Working Paper No. 7, 2016). 
32. Id. at 1. 
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have been transplanted beyond the continent.33 The moderate 
Africanization of IIL is caught in a conundrum. The conundrum is 
exacerbated by the asymmetry and vulnerable status of African states. 
Yet, one should be cautious to dismiss their influence on on-going 
reforms such as the lengthy United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) reform process.34  
Radical Africanization of IIL involves reform agenda where the 
regime is less substantively captured by Western or transnational 
capital interests.35 It acknowledges that IIAs have enhanced imperial 
domination and exploitation of host states through the mobilization of 
treaties, which privileges the usurpation of economic resources in the 
Third World.36 A reform of IIL would be radical if it curtails the spread 
of Western imperialism and the overreach of foreign investors that has 
constrained the space legislative autonomy in host states. A robust 
pursuit of an agenda for the radical Africanization of IIL would bring 
about a new international economic order that incorporates the 
interests of Africa and the Global South on their own terms.  
Radical Africanization of IIL is ambitious, and its aim extends 
beyond the geographical boundaries of Africa to other peripheries. It is 
a revolutionary project that fundamentally requires the remaking of the 
international economic order that has sustained the subordinating 
relations between investors and host states.37 The task of radical 
Africanization then strikes at the heart of the unequal integration of 
the international economic order. In my view, escalating from a modest 
approach to a radical vision of Africanization that challenges the 
contemporary international economic and investment order would be 
ideal for the changes that African states seek. This is a normative call 
 
33. Id. (analyzing the question: to what extent have African countries played 
an active role in the making and shaping of their bilateral investment 
treaties?). The authors empirically track which African states spur 
innovation while others do not both in the context of South-South and 
intra-African negotiations, id. 
34. Although I do not analyze this point in this article, the need to continue 
with this reform agenda from below can be justified on the basis of norm 
cascading that may occur over time. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn 
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 54 INT’L 
ORG., 887, 895 (1998).  
35. For a movement to be transformative, it “must take advantage of the 
highly segmented character of social life — its fragmentation into 
hierarchically ordered citadels of prerogative — in order to experiment 
with forms of social life capable of overcoming the very oppositions — 
between right holding and empowerment or between the quality of grand 
politics and the reality of practical social experience — that this 
segmentation helps strengthen.” Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 672 (1983). 
36. Id. 
37. GETACHEW, supra note 3, at 17.  
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for a more radical Africanization of IIL. However, the inherent 
drawbacks of the moderate Africanization of IIL should not deter 
African states from moving forward with the reforms.38 African states 
should continue to seek opportunities to cascade these changes, even in 
incremental steps, as the opportunities arise.  
III. Africanization of International Investment Law 
Africanization of IIL is a form of post-colonial African international 
legal knowledge production.39 I appropriate the concept to describe a 
legal process or legal phenomena that resists the established oppressive 
order of post-colonial continuities of international legal knowledge 
production.40 As a legal process, Africanization is not an end in itself, a 
closed set of goals, or a policy prescription. Conceptually, Africanization 
of IIL is an evolving critical legal phenomenon with both procedural 
and substantive reform agendas.41 The concept encapsulates holistic, 
incremental, or piecemeal reforms designed to reorder the subordination 
and trappings of traditional IIAs and the ISDS regime.  
Africanization of IIL refers to the substantive and procedural 
actions by African states against the hegemony of an international 
 
38. See Nyanje John, Hegemony in Invest State Dispute Settlement: How 
African States Need to Approach Reforms, AFRONOMICSLAW (Sept. 7, 
2020), https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/09/07/hegemony-in-
investor-state-dispute-settlement-how-african-states-need-to-approach-
reforms/ [https://perma.cc/S2A5-EF4M] for a provocative debate of the 
plight of the African states in the context of the ISDS reforms; Harrison 
Mbori, Exit is the Only Way Out: A Polemic Response to John Nyanje’s 
“Hegemony in Investor State Dispute Settlement: How African States need 




[https://perma.cc/36JT-KR2J] (arguing that while procedural reforms 
are important, substantive and radical reform of IIL should be 
foregrounded, failing which African States should exit the scene). 
39. Akinkugbe, supra note 24. 
40. J.T. Gathii, The Promise of International Law: A Third World View 
(Aug. 29, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3635509 
[https://perma.cc/X9HJ-P862] (challenging the limited geography of 
places and ideas that dominate international law and arguing that the 
Third world is an epistemic site of production and not merely a site of 
reception of international legal knowledge while making a compelling case 
for ending the insularity of international law which is characterized by a 
limited set of locales and ideas); see also Ohio Omiunu, City Reports on 
International Law: Lagos in Focus (Sept. 7, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3688493 
[https://perma.cc/WZN8-YG73]. 
41. See generally Akinkugbe, supra note 24. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Africanization and the Reform of International Investment Law 
15 
 
investment regime that historically subjugated their economic 
development interests in favor of the investor.42 Africanization centers 
African interests in contrast to and as distinct from their Western and 
other Global South counterparts in IIL.43 Africanization of IIL decries 
and responds with substantive reforms to the knowledge, power, and 
information asymmetry in foreign investment law.44  
Africanization of IIL should not be equated to the regionalization 
of the regime. Rather, it situates the broader socioeconomic, political, 
cultural, and sustainable development aspirations of African states with 
the interests of investors who enrich themselves even at the expense of 
the host states and their peoples.45 Africanization challenges the 
disruptive and exploitative impact of ISDS and IIL regimes.46 The 
Africanization concept that I advance acknowledges that the task of 
centering African interests in IIL, “is a dialectical project of engaging 
and overcoming untoward dimensions associated with [the African 
interests] while simultaneously seeking to extend, deepen, transform 
and democratize it as well as the structural and institutional 
environment within which it operates both on the national and 
international scene.”47  
The Africanization of IIL is also an ongoing ideological struggle. 
This ideological struggle is part of a long history of colonial and post-
colonial economic domination, inequalities in transnational legal 
ordering, and capital power of investors and multinational corporations. 
48 As Getachew argues, “relations of economic dependence and 
 
42. Id. 
43. GETACHEW, supra note 3, at 31–33. 
44. Id. 
45. See Anghie, supra note 10. 
46. See generally Akinkugbe, supra note 24. 
47. James T. Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance 
Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 18 
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65, 72 (1998–1999). 
48. In calling for a “postcolonial cosmopolitanism” in response, Getachew 
argues that: “[t]he persistence of unequal integration and hierarchy calls 
for a postcolonial cosmopolitanism that recenters the problem of empire. 
Drawing on the critique of international hierarchy and the anticolonial 
efforts to build a world after empire, which are reconstructed in the 
following pages, this model of cosmopolitanism is less aimed at the limits 
of the nation-state and more concerned with the ways that relations of 
hierarchy continue to create differentiated modes of sovereignty and 
reproduce domination in the international sphere. As described above, 
hierarchy designates not hegemony, but processes of integration and 
interaction that produce unevenly distributed rights, obligations, and 
burdens. These processes of unequal integration are structural and 
embedded in the institutional arrangements of the international order. 
They create the international conditions of ongoing imperial domination.” 
GETACHEW, supra note 3, at 32–33. 
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inequality are often coupled with legal and political modes of unequal 
membership in international society.”49 The difficult task that African 
states confront is to devise strategies that “wage ideological and 
political struggle while minimizing the costs of engaging in an 
inherently legitimating discourse” of IIL.50 The ideological foundations 
of IIL are important and need to be addressed in re-ordering the 
investment regime and economic exploitation of host states by 
investors. Africanization and the legal reform that it undertakes 
broadly decries the violence of IIL and its technologies of governance 
on the economic, environmental, and sustainable development rights of 
African host states.51 However, ostensibly bold legal reforms may mask 
and legitimize continuing inequality and subordination. Legal reform 
alone “cannot serve as a means for fundamentally restructuring” 
international economic relations.52  
To the extent that it engages in reforming and remaking IIL, 
Africanization reflects a strand of the critical agenda of TWAIL. 
TWAIL scholarship relies on a combination of both mainstream and 
critical analysis to expose the ways in which international regime 
obscure the socio-political and economic interests of developing 
countries.53 Further, to the extent that a core goal of TWAIL is a 
“commitment to reforming and remaking international [investment] 
law,”54 I contend that the Africanization of IIL is an example of 
substantive TWAIL response to the critique of IIL. This argument is 
reinforced by the fact that TWAIL is:  
[M]ore than merely a deconstructive and oppositional movement 
or network of scholars, but rather one that sees the potential of 
reforming if not remaking international law for the greater good 
. . . . TWAIL scholarship recognizes that international legal rules 
can be simultaneously repressive and liberatory. In other words, 
 
49. Id. at 32. 
50. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1331, 1387 (1988). 
51. See generally Oladapo Fabusuyi, Africanisation of International 




52. Crenshaw, supra note 50, at 1350. 
53. James T. Gathii, War’s Legacy in International Investment Law, 11 INT’L 
COMM. L. REV. 353, 363 (2009); see also ANTONY ANGHIE, 
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 196, 225–44 (2005). 
54. James T. Gathii, The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL), in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND 
FRONTIERS 12 (Jeffery Dunoff & Mark Pollack, eds., 2019). 
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TWAIL scholars recognize that international law is not always 
an instrument of colonial or post-colonial opposition, it can under 
certain circumstances be an instrument for or a site of liberation.55 
Thus reimagined, my re-conceptualization of Africanization 
channels TWAIL’s regime bias critique of IIL.56 Regime bias seeks to 
understand and appreciate “how specific legal rules . . . shape the 
relationship between international capital and Third World states, as 
well as the institutional nexus between economies, politics, and 
identity.”57 In recognition of the shortcomings of the legal rules of IIA 
for the development of African economies, Africanization seeks a reform 
of the system by centering the critical voices of African states in the 
IIAs where they have negotiation leverage. The Africanization process 
reimagines and reshapes the international investment regime, while 
acknowledging the constraints of the IIL regime.  
However, as currently practiced, Africanization of IIL is at best a 
moderate approach to the reform of the IIL.58 It is a modest agenda at 
rewriting the continent’s contemporary experiences into the IIA 
architecture. The normative call that this article makes is for a bold 
move towards the radical. In its radical form, Africanization of IIL does 
not legitimize the hegemony of traditional IIL regime. Radical 
Africanization does not reify Eurocentric underpinnings of IIL.  
In the next section of this article, I examine the regional substantive 
reforms in IIL. I focus on the innovative aspects of the PAIC model 
agreement that are illustrative of Africanization of IIL. Essentially, my 
point is a simple one: the regional reforms in Africa are a moderate 
response to the international investment system; they are akin to 
window-dressing and therefore do not go far enough to alter the 
foundational rules of IIL.  
 
55. Id. at 29–30.  
56. Gathii, Third World Approaches to International Economic Governance, 
supra note 11, at 261–62 (“the Regime Bias approach emphasizes that 
adverse outcome for Third world countries and poor communities within 
developed economies are not inevitable, and as such that such outcomes 
are not always traceable to a commitment to free market rules or norms. 
Rather, bias is traced in the way in which rules of international trade, 
commerce and investment are crafted, applied, and adjudicated between 
Third world and developed countries or between Third World countries 
and the interests of international capital.”) 
57. Id. at 265. 
58. See generally Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, South-South Investment 
Treaties, Transnational Capital and African Peoples, 21 AFR. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 172 (2013). 
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IV. Substantive Aspects of Africanization of IIL: 
Innovative, but Modest Reforms 
Modern African IIAs differ substantively from the traditional model 
of IIAs.59 Modern IIAs incorporate rules that are relevant to the 
economic and sustainable development of developing countries.60 They 
are deemed progressive, unlike traditional IIAs that maintain the 
structure of domination by investors.61 African states have expressed 
their dissatisfaction with traditional IIAs at both the national and 
regional levels.62 
I do not envision the ongoing reforms of IIL in Africa under the 
rubric of regionalism of IIL alone. In my view, such an approach 
inherently limits the innovative character of some of the investment 
reforms in Africa. It also, perhaps inadvertently, erases the African 
voice in the reform agenda of IIAs and IIL.63 To account for their views 
in the IIA regime, reforms undertaken by African states at the national, 
sub-regional, and regional (or continental) levels have introduced 
innovative provisions in either intra-African BITs or regional 
investment protocols and model agreements.64  
First, at the national level, African states adopted investment laws 
to regulate investment within the country; the 2015 South Africa 
Protection of Investment Act (“Act”), which came into effect on July 
13, 2018, provides a significantly limited protection of foreign 
 
59. See generally Konrad von Moltke & Howard Mann, Towards A Southern 
Agenda on International Investment: Discussion Paper on the Role of 
International Investment Agreements, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. (2004). 
60. See generally id. 
61. See James T. Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance 
Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 18 
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65, 70 (1998–1999) (discussing idea of 
progress in investment sphere among Africans). 
62. See Olwor Sunday Nicholas, International Law and Legal Regimes of 
Foreign Direct Investment in Selected African Countries (Oct. 1, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Social Science Research Network). 
63. In this regard, I agree with Stephan Schill that unlike in other regions, 
regionalism of African international investment law “is less an expression 
of fragmentation or the result of conflicting internal or external interests 
pulling in different directions, but a constructive step in 
defragmentation.” Stephan W. Schill, Editorial: The New (African) 
Regionalism in International Investment Law, 18 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE, 367, 368 (2017). 
64. MAKANE MOÏSE MBENGUE & STEFANIE SCHACHERER, EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA: FEATURES AND 
CHALLENGES OF INVESTMENT LAW “AFRICANIZATION” HANDBOOK 
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y, 2 (2019).  
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investment.65 The Act grants the South African government the right 
to take regulatory measures to redress historical, social, and economic 
inequalities and injustice, foster economic development, protect the 
environment, uphold the rights, values, and principles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and achieve the 
progressive realization of socio-economic rights.66 Historically, the 
South African government was more open to the conclusion of BITs.67 
However, the inequities that the BITs enhanced have led to their 
termination or deliberate lapse by the South African government.68 The 
Act thus fills an important void in investment regulation. However, 
commentators argue that the legislation significantly waters down the 
protection foreign investors enjoy in South Africa.69 For example, a 
contentious aspect of the legislation stripped away the ability of foreign 
investors to challenge South Africa before an international tribunal.70 
In particular, the legislation makes consent to international arbitration 
subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies.71 Hence, unlike 
investment treaties, which prescribe compulsory investor-state 
international arbitration outside of South Africa before an international 
 
65. See Protection of Investment Act, Act No. 22 of 2015, Official Gazette, 
Vol. 606, No. 39514, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-
laws/laws/157/south-africa-investment-act [https://perma.cc/872H-
XSF2]; see generally Malebakeng Agnes Forere, The New South African 
Protection of Investment Act, in RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 251, 265 (Fabio Morosini 
& Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2018); Tarcisio Gazzini, Travelling 
the National Route: South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act 2015, 26 
AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 242, 242–43 (2018). 
66. Gazzini, supra note 65, at 8, 10. 
67. See generally Dennis M. Davis, Bilateral Investment Treaties: Has South 
Africa Chartered a New Course, 2018 ACTA JURIDICA 1, 2 (2018). 
68. Id. at 2–4. 
69. See Phillip de Wet, Ramaphosa Just Activated a Law That Scare Foreign 
Investors – And Makes it Harder for Them to Fight Expropriation, 





71. See Protection of Investment Act, Act No. 22 of 2015, Official Gazette, 
Vol. 606, No. 39514, at ¶ 13(5), 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/157/south-
africa-investment-act [https://perma.cc/872H-XSF2] (“[t]he government 
may consent to international arbitration in respect of investments covered 
by this Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The 
consideration of a request for international arbitration will be subject to 
the administrative processes set out in section 6. Such arbitration will be 
conducted between the Republic and the home state of the applicable 
investor.”). 
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tribunal, the legislation contains no compulsory referral to international 
arbitration at all.72 Although many see the legislation as unsupportive 
of investors,73 I argue that the measure was necessitated by the historic 
inequities of BITs. Hence, it is a response to the challenges of the IIL 
regime as opposed to a deliberate attempt to turn the country’s back 
on investments.  
Second, there have been various BITs concluded between African 
countries and other non-African countries; the 2016 Morocco-Nigerian 
BIT, which contains several innovative provisions, is a classic example 
of this development.74 This new breed of BIT incorporates provisions 
that rebalance the interests of contracting states and the investors.75 
Notably, the Morocco-Nigerian BIT includes provisions that: (1) 
safeguard states discretion in enacting regulation and imposing 
obligations on investors; (2) contribute investment to the host state’s 
sustainable development; and (3) set out an innovative pre-arbitration 
procedure for preventing and resolving disputes — e.g. the Joint 
Committee on the settlement of disputes.76 While the Joint Committee 
and associated “dispute prevention” mechanism are relatively novel 
elements in the context of BITs, the peaceful settlement of disputes is 
an enduring feature of the regional trade agreements in Africa.77 As 
such, its incorporation in the BITs is an indication of the spread of 
norms generated by African states in international economic and 
investment relations. The Morocco-Nigeria BIT thus illustrates the 
 
72. Philip de Wet, supra note 69. 
73. See id. 
74. See Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Between 
the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, Dec. 3, 2016, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/5409/download [https://perma.cc/PS3Y-VK6G] 
[hereinafter Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement]; see also Okechukwu Ejims, The 2016 Morocco-Nigeria 
Bilateral Investment Treaty: More Practical Reality in Providing a 
Balanced Investment Treaty?, 34 ICSID REV. 62, 62–84 (2019). Barnali 
Choudhury, International Investment Law and Noneconomic Issues, 53 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 10 (2020). In comparison, the Nigeria-
Singapore BIT includes more extensive provisions on health and safety, 
the environment and corporate social responsibility than traditional BITs. 
However, they do not have direct obligations on the investor in the same 
way as in the BIT. 
75. See Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, supra 
note 74, at art. 15 (recognizing it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by certain means). 
76. Id. at arts. 23, 24, 26. 
77. Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Peaceful Settlement of Dispute Among African 
States, 1963–1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends, 38 
INT’L & COMP L. Q. 299, 306 (1989). 
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growing density of African IIL reforms aimed at centering the interests 
of the host states.  
Third, there are sub-regional investment rules and model treaties 
or protocols that regional economic communities in Africa have adopted 
or planned to use to regulate their sub-region.78 I will highlight four of 
these developments. First, the adoption of the Supplementary Act on 
Common Investment Rules for the Economic Community of West 
African States in 2008 (“Supplementary Act”)79 aims to promote 
investment that supports sustainable development of the Economic 
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) sub-region.80 It 
“applies to all investments by an investor, whether the investment is 
made before or after the entry into force of [the] Supplementary Act.”81 
There are overlaps between the Supplementary Act and the Morocco-
Nigerian BIT; for example, the Supplementary Act prevents direct 
access to international arbitration for investors thereby limiting the 
traditional investment protections.82 This synergy bodes well for the 
spread of norms generated by the new intra-African BITS. Second, the 
adoption of the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty by the Southern 
African Development Community (“SADC Model BIT”) in 2012.83 The 
SADC Model BIT stated that investments must enhance the 
sustainable development of the host country.84 The SADC Model BIT 
was not intended to be, and is not, a legally binding document.85 
Instead, it offers a template for governments in their future negotiations 
of investment treaties.86 It suggests that a “fair administrative 
 
78. See generally Talkmore Chidede, The Right to Regulate in Africa’s 
International Investment law Regime, 20 OR. R. INT’L L. 437, 449–50 
(2019) (examining the contemporary international investment law 
framework in Africa with a view to determining whether such framework 
preserves host states’ right to regulate investment in public interest).  
79. See Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on 
Investment and the Modalities for their implementation with ECOWAS, 
December 19, 2008, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/treaty-files/3266/download 
[https://perma.cc/522Y-68XP]. 
80. See Ernest Amoabeng Ortsin, The ECOWAS Common Investment 
Market Vision: A Conceptual Preview, in FINANCING AFRICA’S 
DEVELOPMENT: PATHS TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH 221, 
221–22 (Diery Seck ed., 2020). 
81. Supplementary Act, supra note 79, at art. 4(1). 
82. Id. at art. 18(1). 
83. See generally SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
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treatment” should replace the fair and equitable standard in traditional 
IIAs.87 Third, the adoption of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (“COMESA”) and Common Investment Area 
(“CCIA”) in 2007.88 The CCIA agreement is a promotional tool meant 
to guide Member States of COMESA by harmonizing best investment 
practices and facilitating private sector development.89 Although it has 
not been ratified by any of the Member States, plans are afoot to ensure 
that the CCIA gains traction.90 The revised CCIA, which aligns the 
agreement with trends in IIL and specific standards regarding investor 
protection, was adopted by the Council of Ministers of COMESA in 
2017.91 According to COMESA, “the revised CCIA is aligned to the 
Pan African Investment Code championed by the African Union. This 
Framework will provide a platform for the investment chapter that is 
the integral part of the Continental Free Trade Area (“ACFTA”).”92  
Fourth, on a regional level, the PAIC Model Agreement, which 
critically appraised traditional IIAs and provided suggestions, informs 
future negotiations of investment treaties.93 The PAIC Model 
Agreement contains provisions aimed at limiting the standards for the 
protection of investments, requiring investments to foster sustainable 
development and creating new obligations such as human rights, due 
diligence, and the sustainable use of natural resources for investors.94 
 
87. See Sonia E. Rolland & David M. Trubek, Legal Innovation in Investment 
Law: Rhetoric and Practice in Emerging Countries, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 358, 405 (2017). 
88. See The Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment 
Area, May 23, 2007, https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-toolkit-
for-trade-negotiators/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KHY3-FPM2]. 
89. Peter Muchlinski, The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive 
Standards and Procedural Problems in Dispute Settlement, SOAS SCHOOL 
OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 2 (2008). 
90. See Mwangi Gakunga, Plans Afoot to Publicize Common Investment Area 





93. Won Kidane, Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and 
Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft Pan-African Investment Code, 50 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 523 (2018) (analyzing in historical context, with 
theoretical analogies, the experiences of African States with the 
international investment law regime and an evaluation of the PIAC in 
light of its purpose and developments in IIL). 
94. Sustainable development is a feature of the third generation of investment 
agreements. Akinkugbe, supra note 24, 450. (“The third generation of 
investment disputes involving African States starts from 2010 and runs 
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The PAIC Model Agreement provides the basis for the negotiation of 
the ACFTA Investment Protocol.95 The areas of innovative drafting in 
the PAIC include: (1) the definition of investment and investor; (2) 
rejection of pre-establishment commitment; (3) the clarifications of 
“like circumstances” as well as exceptions to national treatment under 
the MFN and National Treatment clauses; (4) the absence of a 
provision on fair and equitable treatment; (5) exceptions to the transfer 
of funds; and (6) performance requirements.96 The PAIC’s preamble 
incorporates provisions important for the agreement’s interpretation.97 
Specifically, the preamble affirms the need to “promote corruption free 
investment and trade regime and improved laws and regulations that 
promote transparency and accountability in governance.”98 
Additionally, the investment must meet the full Salini et al. v. Morocco 
test and should have a significant contribution to the host State’s 
 
to the present moment. Like those of previous generations, third-
generation disputes represent a significant and radical extension of the 
frontiers of issues in ICSID investment dispute jurisprudence. This 
category of investment disputes interestingly incorporates new themes 
such as sustainable development, human rights, protection of indigenous 
rights and environmental standards—to mention a few—in the broader 
discourse on international investment.”). The African Society of 
International Law (AFSIL) Principles on international investment for 
Sustainable Development in Africa offer a series of guiding principles that 
elaborate on sustainable development goals in IIA in Africa. The AFSIL 
Principles “constitute an emancipatory form of contestation, whereby the 
application of the rules of international investment law is tailored to serve 
political projects valued highly by the ASIL while falling short of the 
ambition to revamp the universal investment protection regime.” Alicia 
Köppen & Jean d’Aspremont, Global Reform vs Regional Emancipation: 
The Principles on International Investment for Sustainable Development 




95. See generally MAX MENDEZ-PARRA, ED, AFCFTA INVESTMENT 
NEGOTIATIONS: NOTES ON CONCEPTS (May 2020), 
https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Investment-Training-
Notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VJQ-CDA6]; Hamed El-Kady, The New 
Landmark African Investment Protocol: A Quantum Leap or African 
Investment Policy Making?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2020), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/09/24/the-new-
landmark-african-investment-protocol-a-quantum-leap-for-african-
investment-policy-making/ [https://perma.cc/P284-ZE8L] (arguing that 
the AFCFTA Investment Protocol could result in a “quantum leap” for 
Africa). 
96. See Econ. Comm’n for Af. Comm. of Experts, Draft Pan-African 
Investment Code, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/COE/35/18 (Mar. 26, 2016). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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economic development.99 This extension reaffirms the economic 
developmental model that underpins the design of IIAs in Africa.100 In 
this regard, Mbengue and Schacherer declare,  
The PAIC is . . . an African tuning or recalibration of 
[International Investment Agreements - IIAs]. It reflects the 
development that new IIAs are no longer based on either the 
North American or European models, but that other regions also 
engage in shaping IIAs according to their level of economic 
development and social needs. . . . [It] . . . endows Africa with a 
voice in the international debate on the future and reform of the 
international investment regime.101  
In the context of the PAIC, Mbengue and Schacherer anchor the 
Africanization thesis by focusing on issues relating to developing and 
least-developed African countries, balancing the interests and rights of 
investors and host states alike, and incorporating sustainable 
development goals.102 The influential potential of the PAIC model 
agreement, especially in the course of the negotiation of the ACFTA 
Investment Protocol, should not be underestimated. Mouhamadou 
Madana Kane notes that “the Code can serve as a useful capacity-
building instrument. It can, indeed, provide guidance to the 
negotiators of these agreements, in support of the continent’s 
 
99. Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001). 
100. Dagbanja, supra note 16, at 362 (“The requirement in the PAIC that to 
qualify as an investment, the investment must make a contribution to the 
development of the host state is equally consistent with the development 
imperative that informs the making of IIAs.”). See also Dominic 
Npoanlari Dagbanja, The Development Objective as an Imperative in 
Interpretation of International Investment Agreements, 44 U. OF W. 
AUSTL. L. REV. 
144, 145 (2019); See generally Dominic Napoanlari Dagbanja, The Paradox of 
International Investment Law: Trivializing the Development Objective 
Underlying International Investment Agreements in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, in MODERNIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO 
SUPPORT INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION 
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 258–273 (2017). 
101. Makane Moise Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer, The ‘Africanization of 
International Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the 
Reform of the International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE 414, 447–48 (2017).  
102. See Makane Moise Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer, Africa and the 
Rethinking of International Investment Law: About the Elaboration of the 
Pan-African Investment Code, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
547, 559 (Anthea Roberts et al., eds., 2018) for the authors’ explanation 
of the PAIC’s balanced approach. 
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structural transformation objectives.”103 I will go further, and 
hope that African negotiators will heed the call by many 
academics to be more radical in their drafting of the investment 
protocol. This calls on negotiators to not only adopt some of the 
finest aspects of the PAIC Model Agreement, but to build on it 
in ways that harness the interests of African states and challenge 
the systemic inequities in IIL.  
Premised on the foregoing substantive innovations at the national, 
sub-regional, and regional levels, Mbengue and Schacherer state, “the 
PAIC, the revised SADC Model Treaty, the new COMESA investment 
agreement, and the ECOWIC all consolidate a trend of ‘Africanization’ 
of IIL in the current context of reform of the international investment 
regime.”104 At different times, the scholars describe African states 
variously as international investment rule “makers” or “producers,” as 
opposed to rule “takers” or “consumers.”105 The move by African states 
to “adapt the investment law game to their context, priorities and 
realities . . . show a new vision of Africa: that of a pioneer in setting 
innovative standard for the reform of the international investment 
 
103. See Mouhamadou Madana Kane, The Pan-African Investment Code: A 
Good First Step, but More is Needed, 217 COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES 
1, 2 (2018) (contending that in view of the non-bindingness of the PAIC, 
it should be renamed “Pan-African Guiding Principles on Investor-State 
Relations”) 
104. See Makane Moise Mbengue & Stephanie Schacherer, Evolution of 
International Investment Agreements in Africa: Features and Challenges 
of Investment Law “Africanization,” in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY, 1–23 (Julien Chaisse et al., eds., 2019); 
see also Makane Moise Mbengue, The Quest for a Pan-African Investment 
Code to Promote Sustainable Development, ICTSD: BRIDGES AFRICA 
(June 21, 2016), https://ictsd.iisd.org/bridges-news/bridges-
africa/news/the-quest-for-a-pan-african-investment-code-to-promote-
sustainable [https://perma.cc/7QPF-QFG6]. 
105. See generally Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104 (undertaking a 
comparative law analysis to understand how African interests shape 
different approaches to international investment law and to see how the 
PAIC challenges traditional core approaches.); see also Mbengue & 
Schacherer, supra note 104; Makane Moïse Mbengue, Special Issue: Africa 
and the Reform of the International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD 
INVEST. TRADE 371, 371–78 (2017); Athina Fouchard Papaefstratiou, 
Capucine du Pac de Marsoulies, Martic Tavaut & Clemet Fouchard, The 
Africanisation of Rule-Making in International Investment Arbitration, 
KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, (Aug. 17, 2018), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/08/17/africanisation-
rule-making-international-investment-arbitration/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CK8-KE5K] (noting that African countries, “adapt 
international investment rules to their context, needs and realities and at 
the same time as pioneers in standard-setting activity in international 
investment protection.”). 
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law.”106 The innovative provisions of the PAIC on investment “are most 
appropriate and should be adopted not only in intra-African IIAs but 
also in IIAs involving African countries and non-African countries.”107  
Mbengue and Schacherer argue further that contemporary African 
states are “investment rules providers” as opposed to “investment rules 
consumers.”108 On the one hand, African states were investment rule 
consumers partly because of the “asymmetry in terms of economic 
development between African host countries and investors’ home 
countries.”109 On the other hand, they are investment rule providers 
because of the “adoption of modern investment agreements that apply 
in their respective region.”110 Reinforcing this position, Hamed El-Kady 
and Mustaqeem De Gama argue that African states and their regional 
economic communities are no longer just rule takers, they are 
“investment treaty makers” and are adopting investment policies that 
reflect their own terms and preferences as opposed to rubber stamping 
transplanted models.111  
Mbengue and Schacherer’s latest iteration of Africanization offers 
a less optimistic reflection of the Africanization of IIL. The tone sharply 
contrasts the optimism of their previous analysis.112 Although they 
continue to acknowledge the uniqueness of the Africanization thesis, 
they were concerned that challenges, such as the implementation 
hurdles that the reforms will confront, the lack of binding authority of 
the PAIC, the stratified investment regulatory regime in Africa, and 
the limited geographical spread of the innovative provisions are a huge 
drawback on investment reform gains. To the extent that the 
innovative reforms in the Africanization of IIL have been mainly 
between African states’ IIAs, and have not infiltrated the North-South 
IIAs, they offered some concrete suggestions to move the Africanization 
of IIL forward in Africa.113 They acknowledge that the innovative 
 
106. Makane Moise Mbengue, Africa’s Voice in the Formation, Shaping and 
Redesign of International Investment Law, 34 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. 
L. J. 455, 480 (2019) (“By fostering their own approach to the reform of 
international investment law aligned with their circumstances and needs, 
African countries are effectively ‘africanizing’ the development of 
international investment rules and the reform of the ISDS system.”).  
107. Dagbanja, supra note 16, at 362. 
108. Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104, at 567.  
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Hamed El-Kady & Mustaqeem De Gama, The Reform of the International 
Investment Regime: An African Perspective, 34 ICSID REV. FOREIGN 
INV. L. J. 482 (2019). 
112. Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104, at 1 (distinguishing between 
extra-and intra African IIAs and presenting the African “spaghetti bowl” 
of IIAs in a straightforward manner). 
113. See generally id.  
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provisions that are gradually characterizing the IIAs are limited to 
those concluded between two or more African states or concluded by 
the regional economic communities.114 Essentially, African states have 
not been able to translate these bilateral, national, sub-regional and 
regional innovative provisions into IIA negotiations with Global North 
countries.115 Africanization of IIAs is therefore “confronted with the fact 
that political and economic power continue to structure and define the 
outcome of IIA negotiations.”116 The latest iteration by Mbengue and 
Schacherer reveals the limitations of moderate Africanization of IIL.117 
I will return to the point in the next section. 
From another perspective, in the context of economic relations 
among African states, other scholars have used computational measures 
of textual similarity to offer an analysis based on empirical evidence on 
the question: which African states are rule-takers and rule-makers?118 
Their insight affirms the core argument of this article, that 
Africanization of IIL has only a moderate and limiting effect on the 
systemic challenges of the regime.119 In this regard, Wolfgang Alschner 
and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy distinguish between North-South BITs and 
African South-South BITs.120 On the one hand, in relation to North-
South BITs, African states are rule-takers.121 They have not been able 
to translate their innovative provisions meaningfully as part of the 
substantive provisions of the IIAs that the North parties negotiate.122 
On the other hand, in the context of African South-South BITs, African 
states are rule-makers.123 Even in the context of rule-makers, not all 
African states hold the economic and knowledge bargain that spurs 
innovation in the negotiation of the BITs.124 In their analysis, Alschner 
 
114. Id. at 2.  
115. See generally id. 
116. Id. at 3. 
117. See generally Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104.  
118. See Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Rule-Takers or Rule-
Makers? A New Look at African Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice, 1 
(World Trade Inst. Working Paper No. 7, 2016) (analyzing the question: 
to what extent have African countries played an active role in the making 
and shaping of their bilateral investment treaties? The authors carefully 
track based on empirical analyses which African states spur innovation 
while others do not both in the context of South-South and intra-African 
negotiations). 
119. Id. at 8–9. 
120. Id. at 9–10 
121. Id. at 8–9.  
122. Id. at 6, 13. 
123. Id. at 21. 
124. Id. at 2. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Africanization and the Reform of International Investment Law 
28 
 
and Dmitriy found that “smaller countries such as Mauritius or 
Morocco, presumably due to better in-house expertise and a more 
coherent investment policy agenda, are more successful in setting the 
terms of investment agreements.”125  
To summarize, the novel aspects of African IIAs are a positive step 
in reorienting traditionally problematic provisions of IIAs in favor of 
African states.126 In other cases, some of the IIAs also balance the rights 
and obligations for investors and host states alike.127 They constitute a 
useful point of departure in the global discussion on IIA and ISDS 
reform — as such moderate Africanization of IIL.128 However, systemic 
challenges arising from power imbalance the African IIL regime 
remains.129 The emerging point is that the substantive translation of 
the Africanization of IIL in IIAs is a real dilemma for African states. In 
the next section, I briefly analyze these blind spots. 
V. Blind Spots of Moderate Africanization of 
International Investment Law 
First, moderate Africanization of IIAs engender contradictions, 
reification, and the entrenchment of African states in the very system 
they criticize.130 These contradictions arise from the fact that, although 
some changes occur, they are piecemeal and might easily be described 
as window-dressing as they occur within the framework that has 
constrained and continues to constrain the economic development of 
the host states. Mbengue sees opportunity for African states to not only 
carry on their reforms on IIAs, but also to build on the universal 
acquis.131 He suggests that:  
[w]hen opportune and cost effective, the continent should utilize 
the tools that it readily has at its disposal. For instance, when 
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126. See generally Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104, for a discussion of 
the positive progress toward equity between foreign investors and African 
states. 
127. See generally Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 118, for a review of 
how IIAs can balance rights in African investment treaties. 
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negotiating which ISDS mechanism should be included in 
AfCFTA Investment Protocol, AU member States could take 
advantage of the services offered by ICSID by envisioning the 
creation of an ICSID focal point on the continent.132 
In my view, such a recommendation will likely engender a 
perpetuation of post-colonial continuities that TWAIL and other 
critical scholars have warned against. An ICSID Center in Africa is not 
necessarily a problem; the challenge is that such an approach 
potentially makes arbitration forums in Africa less attractive. The 
foregoing recommendation demonstrates one of the limitations of the 
moderate Africanization to reform and remake IIL. The ICSID 
arbitration regime has been criticized as part of the broader dispute 
settlement architecture in IIL that is unfair to developing countries.133 
TWAIL’s regime bias critique queries such bodies as ICSID.134 
Reverting to an ICSID focal point in Africa raises more questions than 
answers.135 For example, what will be the fate of many regional 
arbitration centers across Africa? Such a moderate Africanization 
approach runs into tension with the clamour by African arbitrators or 
those of African descent to have equal opportunity for representation 
of host state parties. Additionally, it will likely lead to stricter 
competition regime for many African law firms.136 Recently, a “new” 
list of arbitrators of African descent was released as part of the process 
that is designed to make qualified arbitrators visible.137 In my view, this 
is one version of Africanization that radically challenges the dominance 
of Western expertise in the settlement of investment disputes. The list 
was compiled “to [make] professionals more visible and accessible to 
institutions and law firms seeking individuals of colour to appoint as 
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133. Id. at 461–62.   
134. See generally Gathii, supra note 11 (explaining the TWAIL framework 
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Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN St. INT’L L. R. 254, 266 (2007); 
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Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Lessons from 
Uganda’s Bujagali Hydroelectric Project 44 OTTAWA L. R. 213 (2012). 
137. Katherine Simpson & Nancy M. Thevenin, A New List: Arbitrators of 
African Descent, AFRICAN ARB. ASS’N (June 17, 2020), 
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arbitrators, mediators, potential hires, conference speakers, or co-
authors.”138  
Second, African international investment law scholars, such as Won 
Kidane, contend that African states are merely codifying post-colonial 
continuities and the dilemmas they confront.139 Kidane contends that 
since the IIL regime was  
made for Africa . . . When Africa . . . attempts to use the 
normative universe for ordering intra-Africa relations it faces the 
same kinds of dilemmas that it faced in the immediate post-
colonial period relative to colonial boundaries, colonial laws, and 
institutions. The dilemmas have their own history, and the 
history presents its own contemporary dilemmas. The Pan-
African Investment Code [he argues] . . . is nothing but a 
codification of these dilemmas.140 
Further, Kidane argues that,  
any attempt to resolve the dilemmas of history must thus answer 
the perennial question of whether or not the existing doctrines 
and institutions could be sufficiently cleansed of their imperial 
and colonial DNA to be meaningfully deployed for the ordering 
of horizontal relations among those who had endured the 
indignities of subordination.141  
As this article contends, the task of reforming and remaking the 
IIL regime to address African interests requires a radical Africanization 
of IIL. Yet, moderate reforms to remake the system should not be 
discarded as irrelevant because moderate Africanization of IIL does not 
foreclose ongoing and progressive critique and refinement that centers 
African interests. Contemporary IIL is a product of a long history of 
domination. African states’ quest to reform the IIL will not happen 
with a single major change. In my view, if it occurs, it will be the 
outcome of a constellation of moderate Africanization of IIL over a 
reasonable period. 
Third, the moderate Africanization reform leaves African states 
deeply entrenched in the neoliberal trappings of IIL.142 In other words, 
to the extent that the reform only addresses aspects of the problem, as 
opposed to a radical overhaul of the regime, African states will remain 
constrained by the power dynamics and knowledge and information 
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asymmetry which is in favor of the investors.143 The hegemony of 
neoliberal policy ideas in the field of international investment law is 
undeniable.144 As Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah argues, “neo-liberal 
principles will continue to show vitality, particularly because the 
dominant transnational class prefers to maintain such vitality by 
recasting the old structure in new forms.”145 Africanization of IIL 
innovation occurs within the context of IIAs that remain underpinned 
by a neoliberal agenda.146 Neoliberal policy set for economic and 
political freedom are based on stereotypes of failure “lack of political 
free will and economic rationality.”147 Moderate and incremental reform 
does not therefore promise the emancipation that African countries seek 
by the type of reforms undertaken to date.  
Fourth, the innovative characteristics of the moderate 
Africanization of IIL are limited to the African — regional, sub-
regional, and national — regulatory space.148 The fact that the IIAs the 
African states negotiated with home state investors have not included 
some of the innovative provisions of IIAs in Africa reveal the limitation 
of the moderate and incremental approach to the remaking and 
reforming of IIL.149  
In the concluding section of this article, I reflect on how the 
Africanization of IIL as a normative radical project may cascade its 
norms to spread its innovative provisions beyond intra-African IIAs. 
While the proposal may be ambitious, it offers a realistic opportunity 
for the constellation of moderate reforms into radical Africanization of 
IIL over time. 
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VI.  Concluding Remarks: Recalibrating the 
Geographies of Africanization beyond African IIAs 
African states confront an inevitable regime of IIL while seeking 
pragmatic legal strategies to re-organize their own interests in a 
meaningful way in contrast to those of investors. To truly have the 
impact it deserves, the Africanization of IIL must overcome the formal 
barriers that co-constitute the subordination host states. Radical 
systemic reform of IIL regime with consequential economic and legal 
ordering of the relations of international actors would be difficult to 
achieve. However, incremental, moderate or mere procedural window-
dressing is not a desirable condition for African countries either. As this 
article demonstrated, a moderate Africanization of IIL, while useful, is 
limiting.  
To address this conundrum, I contend that a constellation of 
moderate meaningful reforms overtime is more realistic than a single 
radical change. To reform and remake the traditional IIA and ISDS 
regime, modest achievements along the way must be acknowledged 
while we strive for the next “win” against an international investment 
regime that pillages on African resources in the name of investment. 
From a practical point of view, it would be utopian and naive to 
imagine that the IIL system will roll out the red carpet for African 
states or the Global South to center their concerns in IIAs.150 Perhaps 
a pessimistic view, but it seems difficult to see that happening today.  
Since quitting the IIL system is the least of options available, 
African states must continue to seek critical junctures to intervene with 
more meaningful substantive reforms — even if moderate — that 
remake the international investment regime in a way that centres their 
own interests. To truly benefit from such piecemeal approach, there 
must be a longer and more normative radical strategy to the reforms. 
One way to engineer such a radical normative reform is to ensure 
solidarity in other Global South countries. Ensuring that the IIAs 
concluded between Global South countries reflect these innovative 
provisions will push the boundaries of sustainable development, 
environmental protection, national policy space protection, and 
responsible economic investment. As Stephan Schill notes, the specific 
features of African regionalism in investment governance already 
developed “can also serve as a useful example for how regional 
integration in investment law and policy can lead to consolidation and 
ensure legitimacy in investment governance elsewhere. If other regions 
were to follow the African example, the development of multilateral 
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